An Arab minority that has been so loyal to the State of Israel for so long has still not had their efforts and identity recognised constitutionally. With yet more Druze losses in this latest war, is it make-or-break time?
Since the onset of Israel’s war on Gaza on 7 October 2023, the Arab Druze community in Israel has mourned the loss of six members serving in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).
Their deaths, both in Gaza and along the Israel-Lebanon border, included Druze soldiers of high rank. This is crucial for understanding an intensifying debate within the Druze community.
That debate is about the continued viability of the so-called “blood alliance” — the idea of a shared fate between the Druze community and the State of Israel — and has gained momentum with each Israeli war or escalation.
Before October 2023, Druze Arabs were facing new challenges in their bid to secure their ancestral lands and increase their villages’ influence, amplified by restrictive Israeli policies akin to those faced by other Arab citizens.
In an escalation, the Druze began building settlements on their own land, in a move paralleled by Jewish settlers’ establishment of outposts in the West Bank. The aim is to establish so-called “facts on the ground”.
Moreover, the Druze community has called for the repeal of the controversial Nation-State Law passed by the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) in 2018.
As a Basic (or core) Law, it constitutionally enshrines the Jewish identity of Israel, affording privileges and guarantees to its Jewish citizens, often at the expense of the Arab minority, which includes the indigenous Druze population.
Rallying to the flag
Animosity towards the Israeli authorities from Druze community leaders was quickly put aside after the events of 7 October. Instead, the Druze promptly reverted to a role they had played since the State of Israel’s inception.
In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attacks, hundreds of Druze recruits joined the IDF and fought, with some killed.
Their bravery has ignited calls within Israel for Druze rights to be honoured in an equality clause of the Nation-State Law in acknowledgement of their dedication and service.
According to the Israel Democracy Institute, in late 2022, only 40% of Jewish Israelis supported the amendment of the Nation-State Basic Law by adding an equality clause.
However, by the end of 2023, and seemingly due to the considerable number of Druze and Bedouin Israelis who have been killed or wounded in fighting since 7 October, 56% now support an amendment.
Furthermore, support for this has risen across all three political camps of Jewish Israelis. Most notably, it has doubled among right-wing Israelis, whose representatives are currently members of the ruling coalition.
Just for the Druze
On 18 November, the Israeli government said it planned to enact a new Basic Law (which has constitutional weight) specifically for the Druze. In Israel, where there is no constitution, Basic Laws hold significant legal weight.
This proposed law would grant a special status to the Druze community without revoking the contentious Nation State Law, which Israel’s governing far-right coalition would never agree to relinquish.
Any new law just for the Druze would do nothing to quell the calls from others for the Nation State Law to be amended to enshrine equality for all Israeli citizens, both Jewish and non-Jewish.
Meanwhile, debates within the Druze community continue regarding the best way to achieve equality: whether to demand the abolition of the Nation State Law, or to seek alternative solutions.
Various Druze spiritual and political leaders have reached out to Israeli authorities through both individual and collective messages, with a view to advocating for equality in the public sphere.
In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Knesset member Akram Hassoun expressed deep regret that the Druze community needed new laws to ensure their status during a time of war.
He underscored that the Druze were still treated as third-class citizens in Israel, even after 75 years of serving in the IDF.
A running sore
In an interview with Al Majalla, lawyer Samer Ali spoke about efforts to overturn or amend both the Nation State Law and the Kaminitz Law, which increases penalties for building violations and is seen by Arab citizens as aimed at them.
Ali, who leads the Druze Lawyers Forum in Israel and is a prominent critic of the Nation State Law, said efforts to change these pieces of legislation had not only persisted during the 2023 war in Gaza but had intensified.
Israeli restrictions seem to have reaffirmed to the Druze community that post-war life with the laws (as they currently stand) is untenable, yet Ali said Druze demands should not be misconstrued as hostility towards the state.
Ali said there were two options being discussed. One was to amend the Nation State Law to encompass all Arab citizens, based on the principle that fighting discrimination means not being a part of it.
The second was the proposed new law specifically for the Druze, one that would stand parallel to the Nationality Law.
Ali was sceptical about the willingness of Israel’s current far-right government to make changes and hoped that any post-war period would bring about a less extremist Israeli political leadership.
Third-class citizens
Researcher and jurist Marzouk Halabi, who writes about the law’s effects on the Druze community, says all efforts to amend the Nation State Law are insufficient because the core issue is its emphasis on Judaism, a component that no proposed amendment seeks to alter.
For him, the law is fundamentally Jewish and extends to Jews globally, not specifically Israeli Jews, so he doubts whether any Israeli government will significantly alter the trajectory of justice for Arab citizens in general.
Speaking to Al Majalla, Halabi says the “political behaviour” of the Druze members remained consistent both before and after 7 October, with clear opposition to both the Nation State Law and the Kaminitz Law.
The Druze don’t like being treated the same as other Arab citizens, especially given their significant efforts in building an Israeli identity, he says.
They see the law as prioritising Jewish status while overlooking the unique position and contribution of Israel’s Druze minority, with its emphasis on solidarity, sacrifice, and continued military service.
Over decades, the Druze have forged an identity that is antagonistic to the Palestinians, explains Halabi. This began with a policy implemented after the Nakba in 1948, administratively segregating the Druze from Arab districts.
It aimed to detach the Druze from broader Arab and Palestinian communities and assimilate them into the Zionist framework.
‘Israelising’ the Druze
A decisive moment in 1956, with the imposition of mandatory military service on the Druze, initially in units specifically for minorities, before their integration into various military units and progression through the ranks.
There was initial resistance from the Druze community, which felt strongly attached to Arabs and Palestinians. In response, Israel confiscated land from Druze farmers and limited their employment opportunities.
Efforts to ‘Israelise’ the Druze extended to education. The curriculum deliberately excluded broader Arab narratives, so the new Druze generation would be more aligned with Israel and more amenable to military service.
Halabi says the Israeli media also played a role in reinforcing the separation of Druze and other Arab citizens.
This was also perpetuated by employing Druze in intermediary roles within education and the civil service, acting as liaisons between the state and Palestinians (commonly referred to as ‘Arabs 48’).
Defining Druze identity
This complex socio-political context helps to shape the current identity and stance of the Druze community in Israel today.
Its historically high IDF enlistment rate (around 80%) continues and even surpasses the enlistment rate of Jewish Israelis, while 65% of Druze breadwinners are employed by the State of Israel.
Around 150,000 Israeli Druze are primarily settled in 18 towns in the north, across the Carmel and Galilee regions, including four villages in the occupied Golan, the Druze population having increased tenfold since 1948.
Many still adhere to Arab customs and traditions, aspects that both Halabi and Ali say the Druze consider fundamental to their identity.
Efforts to ‘Israelise’ the Druze extended to education. The curriculum deliberately excluded broader Arab narratives, so the new Druze generation would be more aligned with Israel and more amenable to military service.
Halabi says the Israeli media also played a role in reinforcing the separation of Druze and other Arab citizens.
This was also perpetuated by employing Druze in intermediary roles within education and the civil service, acting as liaisons between the state and Palestinians (commonly referred to as ‘Arabs 48’).
Defining Druze identity
This complex socio-political context helps to shape the current identity and stance of the Druze community in Israel today.
Its historically high IDF enlistment rate (around 80%) continues and even surpasses the enlistment rate of Jewish Israelis, while 65% of Druze breadwinners are employed by the State of Israel.
Around 150,000 Israeli Druze are primarily settled in 18 towns in the north, across the Carmel and Galilee regions, including four villages in the occupied Golan, the Druze population having increased tenfold since 1948.
Many still adhere to Arab customs and traditions, aspects that both Halabi and Ali say the Druze consider fundamental to their identity.
Al Majalla Magzine
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